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Minority Report: Re-Reading
Gilgamesh After Levinas
Francis Dominic Degnin, PhD1

Abstract
The Epic of Gilgamesh attempts to answer the question of how, given the finality of death, one might find meaning and happiness
in life. Many commentators argue that the text provides two separate, although ultimately unsatisfactory, alternatives. What
these commentators appear to miss, however, is the possibility that these two solutions may not be separate. Using Levinas’s
distinction between “need” and “desire,” I argue that, by the end of the Epic, they may in fact be synthesized into a single
solution, one that suggests the priority of an affective moral grounding as prior to and more fundamental than intellectual
solutions.
Keywords
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The Epic of Gilgamesh attempts to answer the question of
how, given the finality of death, one might find happiness,
meaning, and value in this life. Many commentators argue
that the text provides two separate, although ultimately
unsatisfactory, alternatives.
The first is fame—if I build lasting monuments or perform heroic acts, I can live forever in the memories of others.
Early in the Epic, we see this solution in the building of the
walls of Uruk and in the slaying of Humbaba. Yet, with the
death of his dear friend, Enkidu, Gilgamesh concludes that
fame is ultimately empty. He wants his friend back. Even
more, he fears his own demise. So he journeys to the end of
the Earth to find the two humans who have been granted
immortality by the gods. Once there, he discovers that theirs
was a unique circumstance that he could not hope to repeat.
Gilgamesh also receives a second answer to finding meaning and happiness in this life. He is told to eat, drink, and be
merry. Love your wife, hold your children close, be satisfied
with the simple joys of living. As Gilgamesh’s culture did not
believe in a robust afterlife, this was the best to which one
could aspire. Gilgamesh, at last resigned to his mortality,
accepts his role as ruler and shepherd for his subjects.

Why Seek an Alternative? Using
Levinas to Understand the Epic
What is troubling about this interpretation is that these “solutions” are so easily dismissed. For our culture, wherein many
believe that this life only has meaning in the context of some
ultimate, eternal afterlife, such a dismissal makes sense.
Even those who do not share a belief in an afterlife may tend

toward the assumption that “primitive” cultures have little to
teach us in this regard. Taken in terms of the Epic’s culture,
were these solutions really so inadequate? Why did this story
endure? One characteristic of great literature is that it speaks
to human experience in a multitude of ways. It is possible
that the story is intended to reflect upon the many ways in
which nature does not, ultimately, satisfy human desires. But
it seems facile to use this to dismiss the possibility of a richer
reading of the solutions proposed by the Epic. Looking
deeper, we may find resources on par with, even richer than,
some of our modern ways of addressing these questions.
It is not that the solutions offered here are absent from the
literature. It is just that many commentators believe, as does
Kramer, that “none of [them] holds any real promise”
(Kramer, 1988, p. 100). Even George, one of the Epic’s great
scholars, appears to discount what may prove to be a key
moment in the Epic—downplaying shifts in the death of
Enkidu and explaining care for one’s subjects as “duty” to the
gods (George, 1999, p. xxxvii; 2003, p. 504). But although
George may at times fall prey to this tendency, for the most
part, he rises above it. George is exactly right when he notes
that the Epic has often been understood as a “vehicle for
reflection on the human condition” (George, 2003, p. 527).
Gilgamesh endured as an Epic because it spoke, on multiple
levels, to the lives of the people who created it.1
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Part of the reason these solutions are so easily discounted
may be that they are usually understood as isolated, static categories. But just as Gilgamesh undergoes a process of transformation throughout the Epic, so, too, do these two solutions. By
the end of the Epic, they may well become aspects of a single,
transformed solution, one that is richer in its implications for
human life and happiness than our current reading. Such a transformation can only be understood if we moderate at least two
fairly common assumptions. First is the modern assumption that
all human behavior can be understood as some form of egoism
or self-interest. Second is the assumption that this life can only
have meaning in terms of an infinite continuation of the self.
Levinas, operating out of both the Greek and Hebrew traditions,
can help us to see that these are not the only alternatives.
Why Levinas? First, Levinas operates out of the Hebrew
tradition, which is not only from the same part of the world as
the Epic, but may also have shared a common source with
Ecclesiastes. This suggests that there may have been similarities between aspects of these traditions. In fact, a crucial passage of the Epic for making the link to Levinas’s thought is
one that closely parallels a passage in Ecclesiastes. Second, as
a phenomenologist, Levinas focuses on those basic experiences that define us as human. This is consistent with the possibility that the Epic is meant to describe basic aspects of our
human condition. Specifically, Levinas argues that at the heart
of our humanity is the recognition of a powerful, yet fragile,
pre-intellectual experience of care. This is an experiential
claim. If accurate, this affective call to care—particularly for
those who are most vulnerable—lies at the heart of both ethics
and the development of everything we think of as human. This
includes the capacities of speech, reason, freedom, self, morality, and even particular forms of violence.2 While this experience is pre-rational, if Levinas is correct, some form of this
experience should be found in every culture.
For example, it has been argued that this call, while not
fully articulated, surfaced in Greek medicine, underlying
important aspects of the Hippocratic Oath (Degnin, 2007). In
Gilgamesh, its implications are even more radical.
1.

2.

First, it provides a new way of viewing the solution
of the Epic: that the meaning of life and happiness are
found, not primarily in intellectual beliefs, but within
rich, emotional, and embodied relationships of care.
Second, if accurate, this suggests that an excessive
focus on individual afterlife can, at times, be a product of intellectual abstraction, born of an attempt to
replace real, relational connections in a desperate bid
for certainty.3

Regardless of the actual status of an afterlife, an excessive
dependence on such beliefs, far from being a realistic source
of meaning in this life, might actually serve to undermine it.
It might also undermine any reasonable and compassionate
ethics. One need only consider the many atrocities, both historical and modern, that have been justified to earn

said afterlife. In fact, some studies suggest that non-religious
people may in fact be more motivated by compassion than
those who profess to be religious.4 What Gilgamesh learns,
and can teach us, is that the meaning of life, and the source of
ethics, can be found right here, in the call to care.
This also ties to a second reason why Levinas is particularly useful in re-reading the Epic. As both a student of
Heidegger and of Judaism, Levinas provides both a powerful critique of aspects of Western philosophy and a bridge
between insights of his Jewish heritage with Western
thought. This bridge is particularly suggestive in terms of
the Epic. Not only were the Hebrews neighbors to the cultures that spawned the Epic, there is evidence that Hebrew
scriptures shared common textural resources with the
Epic—particularly the flood narrative and Ecclesiastes
(Jones, 1990). Finally, there was a similar worldview in
terms of an afterlife. Early Judaism, as with some sects
today, found meaning and value in life without recourse to
an afterlife. Understanding this worldview could provide a
resource for understanding this aspect of the Epic. But for
this, we need to turn to the text of the Epic.

Reading the Text
Consider the attitude of the Epic toward human mortality:
As for man, [his days] are numbered,
whatever he may do, it is but the wind,
. . . exists not for me . . . (George, 1999, p. 19 [text lost])

George then compares this with a text from Ecclesiastes
3:19-20:
. . . as one does, so dies the other.
They all have the same breath.
. . . all is vanity . . .
. . . all are from dust, and all turn to dust again.

Both focus on the ephemeral nature of human life, we are
but breath or wind. But if this is so, what gives one meaning
and value in life? In the beginning, the Epic suggests fame,
either by great works or heroic deeds. Gilgamesh does both,
beginning with the great wall and temples of the city:
Climb Uruk’s wall and walk back and forth
Survey its foundations, examine the brickwork!
Were its bricks not fired in an oven?
Did the Seven Sages not lay its foundations? (George, 1999, p. 2)
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As long as the city endures, so, too, would the memory of
its builder. To ensure this, Gilgamesh had the story of his life
and deeds inscribed on the wall. But this was not enough.
Gilgamesh’s desire for the second sort of fame guided his
decision to kill the protector of the forest:

For the goddess of weddings was ready the bed,
for Gilgamesh, like a god, was set up a substitute.
Enkidu with his foot blocked the door of the wedding house,

I will conquer him in the Forest of Cedar:

not allowing Gilgamesh to enter.

let the land learn Uruk’s offshoot is mighty!

They seized at the door of the wedding house,

Let me start out, I will cut down the cedar,

in the street they joined combat . . . (George, 1999, p. 16)

I will establish for ever a name eternal! (George, 1999, p. 20)

Early in the Epic, Gilgamesh’s focus was on his own
needs. Due to his great strength and endurance, he terrorizes
his own people, exhausting the men in games and demanding
the right to sleep with brides on their wedding nights:
The young men of Uruk he harries without warrant,
Gilgamesh lets no son go free to his father,
By day and night his Tyranny grows harsher . . . (George, 1999,
p. 3)
. . . lets no girl go free to her bride [groom] . . . (George, 1999, p. 4)

Because none could stand against Gilgamesh, Enkidu was
created in response to the pleas of the people. He was
intended to become friend and companion to Gilgamesh, to
provide a healthier outlet to Gilgamesh’s “enthusiasm” and
to teach Gilgamesh to care. Enkidu begins more as wild beast
than man, of strength comparable to Gilgamesh, but of a substantially different temperament. Whereas Gilgamesh was
like a spoiled child, caring only for himself, Enkidu began as
a caretaker for the other beasts, springing them from hunter’s
traps and protecting them from harm. Enkidu exhibited a
natural compassion that was, in the beginning, merely latent
in Gilgamesh. Seduced and civilized by the temple priestess
Shamhat, Enkidu loses the trust of the wild beasts but gains
the benefits of civilization. He becomes Gilgamesh’s close
companion.
But first, Enkidu challenges Gilgamesh. In part,
Enkidu’s challenge to Gilgamesh was that of any alpha
male asserting dominance. But from the text, we see that
there is more. Upon arriving in Uruk, he is told that
Gilgamesh is about to claim “first night,” the right to sleep
with a new bride before her groom. George’s claim that
Enkidu’s “face paled in anger” (George, 1999, p. 15) suggests that Enkidu was not motivated only by the desire to
show dominance, but by a sense of moral outrage. But
even without that claim, the fact is that his first act upon
arriving in Uruk, one of compassion for the vulnerable,
was to stand between Gilgamesh and the bride Gilgamesh
intended to despoil.

In the battle that followed, Gilgamesh prevailed, but only
just. Meeting for the first time someone who could stand
against him, he found someone he could love and respect.
They became fast friends.
The arrival of Enkidu can be seen as a relief to the citizens
of Uruk in at least two ways. First, by providing a companion
and equal to Gilgamesh, he distracts Gilgamesh from seeking to entertain himself at the expense of his people. But
there is much more. The arrival of Enkidu began a process of
transformation on the part of Gilgamesh. Just as children
need boundaries in order to learn to care, so, too, Gilgamesh
needed an equal to help set those boundaries.5 Gilgamesh,
for all his power, was bored—he abused his own people in a
vain attempt to entertain himself.
The gods divine with remarkable insight what is at the root of
the trouble: Gilgamesh’s superior energy and strength set him
apart and make him lonely. He needs a friend, someone who
measures up to him and can give him companionship on his own
extraordinary level of potential and aspiration. (Jacobson,
1976/2001)

Thus, Enkidu, while submitting to Gilgamesh, won the
battle in two crucial ways. First, he won the respect and love
of Gilgamesh. Second, we never hear again that Gilgamesh
sought the right of first night. Enkidu succeeded in his
defense of the vulnerable.
The defense of the vulnerable, the capacity to care, is, for
Levinas, the key humanizing trait. In this sense, Enkidu,
even in his beast-like state, began the Epic the more human
of the two. Levinas argues that it is precisely the inversion of
normal power relationships, this strange capacity of the vulnerable to evoke the power of compassion, that is at the heart
of all we characterize as human. The experience is fragile
and pre-rational. Fragile because it does not always happen,
fragile, too, because it is easily swept aside. This differs from
self-interest—enlightened or not—in that the focus of selfinterest is the ego, the needs of the person. Levinas speaks to
a capacity to set those needs aside, to place oneself in service
to another. He calls this counter impulse desire (Levinas,
1969, p. 117). Sometimes, it is just a moment: I see another
person or creature in pain, and for an instant, I forget myself,
feeling only a desire to relieve that suffering. It is not that
one’s own needs are unimportant. In fact, as Levinas writes,
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only a being who can eat can know what it is like for another
to go hungry, only a being that can feel pleasure and pain can
care (Levinas, 1981, p. 74). It is rather that, to become fully
human, the needs of the one must be balanced, and at times
subordinated, by care for others. To be clear:
Needs: Are robust and basic to us all. They point “inward” to the
person, to caring for oneself, to the satisfaction of basic human
“needs” (food, shelter, etc.)
Desire: Is more fragile, in the sense that it is more easily “lost”
or overwhelmed by needs. Desire points outwards, toward
caring for and serving others. However, if nurtured, it can
become strong enough to even overcome basic needs.

It should be emphasized that, without need, there might be no
desire. One must be able to experience needs (and their satisfaction) not just to understand another’s specific needs, but even to
understand the concept of need. In a “perfect” world, where there
were no needs, there would also be no space for compassion.
Understood in these terms, Gilgamesh won more than a
physical battle. Through Enkidu, Gilgamesh first experienced limits, even pain, and gained a companion he respected
and loved. This began a process by which he would, in
stages, learn to live beyond his own selfishness. Gilgamesh
was now vulnerable. But he was also no longer bored.
To clarify how this changes the Epic’s answer to meaning
in life, it helps to jump ahead to the second solution. Here,
Gilgamesh, despondent after the death of Enkidu, is seeking
the help of the one person who escaped mortality. In an older
version of the story, he receives the following advice from
Shiduri, the goddess/alewife:
But you, Gilgamesh, let your belly be full,
Enjoy yourself always by day and by night,
Make merry each day
Dance and play day and night!

Let your clothes be clean,
let your head be washed, may you bath in water!
Gaze on the child who holds your hand,
Let your wife enjoy your repeated embrace! (George, 1999,
p. xxxvi)
George notes the close parallel to Ecclesiastes 9:7-9:
Go thy way, eat thy bread with joy,
and drink thy wine with a merry heart . . .
let thy garments be always white, . . .

live joyfully with the wife whom thou lovest . . . (George, 1999,
p. xxxvi)

It is passages such as these that suggest a common origin
for both texts. Both begin with eating and drinking, taking
joy in life’s simple pleasures, wearing clean garments, and
end with loving one’s family. But it seems to me that the real
import of these passages has been discounted. It is easy for
those in our culture to notice the “eat, drink, and be merry”
message. This parallels our notion of self-interest and
Levinas’s notion of the value and motivation of need. Such
an interpretation is characteristic of Gilgamesh’s behavior at
the start of the Epic. Yet it is important to notice that, even
prior to receiving this advice, the Epic had already declared
the inadequacy of said interpretation. Why then bring it up?
Perhaps the lack is not in the “solution,” but in Gilgamesh’s,
and our, understanding.
Because our culture focuses primarily upon self-interest,
we tend to read both parts of Shiduri’s advice in terms of
self-interest. But that is not necessarily the case in either
Shiduri’s speech or the passage from Ecclesiastes. It is possible that these passages address both aspects (need and
desire) of human experience.
Need is addressed in the exhortation to eat, drink, and be
merry.
Desire is addressed in the exhortation to love one’s wife
and child.
In addition, even the reference to clean clothing reminds
one, not of the isolated individual, but of the member of a
community. For an ancient culture, cleanliness was a sign of
being part of a greater community. Only those who were part
of a community typically had the energy to spare from survival to worry about cleanliness. As part of the community,
one was expected to care for more than just oneself. Thus,
Gilgamesh, following the death of Enkidu, wandered the
wilds clad only in the skin of a lion. This was both where
Gilgamesh was, in a sense, lost to both himself and to civilization. When he is re-clothed in garments that will not dirty
until he reaches home (a place where they could be cleaned),
he is reborn, re-civilized.
If everything in life is reduced to need, human meaning is
reduced to a search for the service and survival of the ego.
But if Levinas is correct, that which makes us distinctly
human is our ability to also care for others—at times, prior
to and more than for ourselves. In this reading, meaning is
not found in the preservation of the ego, even if that preservation is into an eternal thereafter, but in the joining of a rich
life in the giving of oneself to others. The real import of the
passage is the balance6 between the two parts, the second of
which Gilgamesh will understand only at the end of his
journey.
There are few passages more suggestive of this possibility
than the scene of Enkidu’s death. When Enkidu is told he is
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going to die, he becomes bitter, cursing all those who led him
out of the forest to his death. Then the god Shamash speaks
to Enkidu:
O Enkidu, why curse Shamhat the harlot,
who fed you bread that was fit for a god,
and poured you ale that was fit for a king,
who clothed you in a splendid garment,
and gave you as companion the handsome Gilgamesh?
And now Gilgamesh, your friend and your brother,
[will] lay you out on a magnificent bed,
[On] a bed of honor he will lay you out,
[he will] place you on his left, on a seat of repose,
[the rulers] of the underworld will all kiss your feet.
The people of Uruk [he will have] mourn and lament you,
the [thriving] people he will fill full of woe for you.
After you are gone his hair will be matted in mourning,
[clad] in the skin of lion, he will wander the wild. (George, 1999,
p. 58-59)

This speech turned Enkidu’s heart, so that his anger was
stilled, he blessed those whom he has just cursed:
Enkidu heard the words of Shamash the hero,
. . . his heart so angry grew calm,
. . . [his heart] so furious grew calm,
“Come, [Shamhat, I will fix your destiny!]
[My] mouth [that] cursed you shall bless [you] . . .” (George,
1999, p. 59)

The question is: Why did Enkidu die in peace? Based on
two readings of the Epic, there appear to be two possibilities.
In terms of the first reading of the Epic, one might argue that
Enkidu, having been reassured that his name would live forever, could now rest in knowing that he had achieved the
only form of immortality possible for mortals: living a rich
life and having died famous.7 Yet it is precisely with the
death of Enkidu that Gilgamesh comes explicitly to reject
both fame and a life of pleasure as adequate solutions to
happiness. This strongly suggests that these self-centered
solutions miss the point of the Epic. Instead, following

Levinas’s notion of desire, it seems to me that Shamash’s
speech reminded Enkidu of how deeply his friend would suffer upon his death and how much the gifts that they had
shared meant to them both. It was Enkidu’s love and compassion for others, so characteristic of his life, that mitigated his
anger and allowed Enkidu to die in peace. Enkidu would live
on. But it was not for the sake of personal fame, it was for the
sake of the love he had shared and the positive impact of
Enkidu’s life upon those whom he had come to love. In this
way, both “solutions” are transformed. Whereas at the beginning of the Epic, both (fame and living a rich life) are separate and self-centered, with Enkidu, they become a single,
other centered solution, focused on care for one’s loved ones.
This reading finds support in Gilgamesh’s response to
Enkidu’s death. Gilgamesh’s love for Enkidu opens a door to
love, but Gilgamesh only came to understand its meaning in
stages. While his grief was authentic, what made Gilgamesh
inconsolable was that he was still focused too much on himself:
For his friend Enkidu Gilgamesh
did bitterly weep as he wandered the wild:
“I shall die, and shall I not be as Enkidu?”
Sorrow has entered my heart! (George, 1999. P. 70)

Gilgamesh’s love of Enkidu had rendered him vulnerable to
pain. But instead of turning that pain toward care and honor for
others, he turned inward upon himself. He continued to pursue
life and relationships as acts of aggression, something to be
dominated and won, and not something calling for engagement
and a profound surrender of the self for the sake of others. The
journey that completes the Epic was needed for Gilgamesh to
complete these lessons. Along the way, he meets various gods,
goddesses, and their servants, initially discarding their wisdom,
but also experiencing how his natural aggression acted against
his goals. For example, his destruction of the “stone” poles8 on
the Ferryman’s boat, while intended to intimidate the Ferryman
as a show of power, actually rendered them unable to cross the
sea (George, 2003, p. 499). So Gilgamesh had to cut new poles
and find new strategies to assist the Ferryman. When he arrives
at the home of Uta-napishti, the only human to win eternal life,
his intent had been to wrestle the secret from him by force. But
instead of finding a heroic figure, greater than life, he finds an
ordinary man. And, at this point, he loses his desire to dominate
Uta-napishti. Gilgamesh is coming to learn prudence—and
perhaps a bit of humility:
I look at you, Uta-napishti:
your form is no different, you are just like me . . .
I was fully intent on making you fight,
but now in your presence my hand is stayed. (George, 1999, p. 88)
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While at the home of Uta-napishti, he is given and fails
additional tests, coming even further to grip with his mortality and his limits. Gilgamesh is disappointed but resigned to
his fate. And this is where many commentators leave us. But
while the transformation of the two solutions is not as clean
as with the death of Enkidu, there are at least four pieces of
evidence that it occurs.
First, in the prologue to the standard edition, the poet writes:
“He came a far road, was weary, found peace . . .” (George,
1999, p. 1)
Second, he is given a garment which will not become soiled
until he reaches home and is again able to receive clean clothing
(George, 1999, p. 98). This clothing, replacing the animal pelts
he had been wearing, serves as a symbol that he has been
re-civilized (transformed), that he is ready to rejoin the human
community.
Third, there is the pivotal position of the story of Enkidu’s death
as the event which launched the journey—still our strongest
piece of evidence.
Fourth, there is the record of Gilgamesh as becoming a wise and
beloved ruler following his return.

Of course, the Epic externalizes this fourth item as the will
of the gods. But rather than simply taking the Epic at its word,
let us return to the insight that these motifs could be ways of
expressing inner spiritual and cultural truths. If Levinas is correct, it is precisely care that forms an internal relationship of
meaning. In other words, just as the capacity for care precedes
rationality, so, too, the meaning of life is something that must
be experienced, it must be felt in the lived connections with others.9 Of course, we do not want to die. But an obsessive desire
for an afterlife, as evidenced by Gilgamesh, is not, in fact, the
means to happiness. It may, instead, be a path to misery.
At the end of the Epic, Gilgamesh returns home, ready to
take up his position as ruler. But he is no longer the ruler of
the beginning of the Epic. He has become a humble, wiser
man. When he returns with the Ferryman at his side, he takes
him again to the walls of Uruk:
O Ur-shanabi, climb Uruk’s wall and walk back and forth!
Survey its foundations, examine the brickwork!
Were its bricks not fired in an oven?
Did the Seven Sages not lay its foundations?
A square mile is city, a square mile is date-grove,

The words echo the beginning of the Epic. But has
Gilgamesh simply resigned himself to the notion that such
fame is the only immortality available to humankind? Or has
the meaning of the passage changed? George, even without
the benefit of Levinas’s thought, names and objects to the
common view:
It is often supposed that [these lines] reveal in Gilgamesh an
acceptance that he will make do with the immortal renown
brought to him by building the city’s wall. That is too specific a
view. For while the epilogue begins by taking the audience in
their imagination up on the wall once more, the last two lines
make it clear that the poet fixes our gaze firmly on what the wall
encloses . . . (George, 2003, p. 526)

The gaze is fixed, not on the wall itself, but on whom the
wall shelters. It is no longer primarily about Gilgamesh, but
about those for whom he cares.

Transforming the Man and the Message
Just as Gilgamesh undergoes a series of transformations, so,
too, do these “solutions.” Both begin as egocentric
pursuits—Gilgamesh starts as a tyrant and a hedonist. The
reason neither fame nor living well is satisfying is because
both solutions are focused on himself—his ego—not on service to others. Through a series of transformations that occur
throughout the text, Gilgamesh discovers a deeper, richer
way of life. He discovers the value of care. It is this value,
this embodied connection, that provides the unifying force
for the two solutions and that provides, if this reading of the
Epic is correct, the only authentic means for human satisfaction. Once discovered, Gilgamesh ceases to live primarily
for his own pleasure. Personal fame, while still desired, loses
importance. The joy he takes in daily life, the simple pleasures and human connections, these become sources of real
satisfaction. Even living on in the memory of others is transformed from a focus on personal accomplishments to a focus
on service.
The story ends with him showing the wall to the
Ferryman—but its meaning and emotional tenor have
changed. It is no longer primarily about Gilgamesh’s personal pride, although he still takes pride in and would like to
be remembered for the accomplishment. Its deeper value,
that which has become of greater importance to Gilgamesh,
is how well it shelters his people.
Thus, both “meanings” are transformed:
Seize the Day! (Eat, drink, and be merry)

a square mile is clay-pit, half a square mile the temple of Ishtar:

Is no longer just about personal pleasure, but about the joy
of caring for one’s family, one’s children, one’s neighbors.

three square miles and a half is Uruk’s expanse. (George, 1999,
p. 99)

Fame! (Living on in the memory of others through monuments
or enduring walls)
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Is no longer primarily about his personal fame, but about
their value in sheltering his people.
Fame! (Living on in the memory of others through great deeds)

Is now about having contributed to their lives and wellbeing, not just about personal immortality.
Perhaps another way of thinking about this would be to
ask the question:
If you had a choice between
1.
2.

being “forgotten,” but having made the lives of your
children and their children richer and happier for
your passing; or
you could be one of the most famous people to ever
live, so that almost all people would know your
name, but that this name would be “Hitler,”

which would you choose?
If you would choose to be “forgotten,” but having made
life better for your loved ones, the Epic speaks to you.
Thus, for the Epic:
“Egoistic” pleasure instead becomes focused on the pleasure of service, being part of a community.
“Egoistic” fame shifts from merely leaving a legacy to
leaving a more specific legacy, a legacy of care.
Which then shifts to a single solution, where
The meaning of life is found, not in living forever (either
immortality or in an afterlife), but in the concrete relationships by which we live and give of ourselves in this
life.
It is not that Gilgamesh does not also seek his own pleasure, he still wants to be remembered. But these needs are
now placed in the larger context of this desire to serve his
people, to be a wise and kind ruler, rather than a tyrant.
Given that we know so little of the language and culture,
we cannot be sure that this reading is any more “correct” than
other readings. As is true of any great literary work, it
addresses the human condition from a rich variety of avenues. The value of reading the Epic in the light of Levinas’s
thought is that Levinas offers us evocative ways to approach
difficult problems in the text, particularly Enkidu’s strange
change of heart upon his death.
From another angle, this also parallels an insight recorded
by Kubler-Ross, a pioneer in the study of death and dying:
To rejoice at the opportunity of experiencing each new day is to
prepare for one’s ultimate acceptance of death. For it is those
who have not really lived—who have left issues unsettled,
dreams unfulfilled, hopes shattered, and who have let the real
things in life (loving and being loved by others, contributing in

a positive way to other people’s happiness and welfare, finding
out what things are really you) pass them by—who are most
reluctant to die. (Kubler-Ross, 1975, p. xi)

I have seen this, along with others, working as hospital
chaplain. To take the insight a step further, it appears to me,
and to many with whom I have worked, that it is not one’s
belief in an afterlife that correlates most strongly with
whether one goes peacefully into that great beyond. It is
really the two things named by Kubler-Ross:
First, whether one feels that one has lived a rich and full
life (seize the day).
Second, whether one is surrounded by those one loves,
whether one feels as though one has made positive contributions to their lives, and they to yours.10
For those who have listened to the insights of the Epic,
this “truth” should come as no surprise.
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Notes
1. There is controversy on this point; some believe that the Epic
existed primarily in written form for the court and intellectual elite. Although we lack the evidence to be certain, George
argues in favor of a wider oral tradition (see George, 2003).
Even if the former were true, it still appears that it would have
held such a position with the court. Also, it is worth noting that
the sections on both the flood and the afterlife were not considered parts of the main body of the Epic, but were side stories.
Here, we are focused on what is called the “standard” version.
2. Because there are various schools of thought as to how to read
Levinas, and because the differences between schools is not
crucial for this thesis, I have left the more detailed development of these themes to other works. Here, I focus mainly
on themes, such as the distinctions between need and desire,
which appear as a common denominator to any interpretation of Levinas’s work. To serve a wider audience, I have also
avoided the use of most technical language.
3. Even if one believes in an afterlife, the Epic has much to
teach us. One thing I suggest to my students is to set aside
their belief in an afterlife, at least for the first part of my Death
and Dying course, because facing that fear had a lot to teach
us. My own experience, which included service as a hospital
chaplain, suggests that those who use their belief in an afterlife
to escape their fear are more likely to be dogmatic and judgmental. However, the psychology and spirituality of those who
face that fear, embrace it, and learn from it, are much different,
whatever their beliefs about an afterlife. Their beliefs are, in

8

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.
9.

SAGE Open
important ways, transformed. The Epic can be read as a story
of facing that fear.
It should be noted that these studies do not prove that religious
persons are less generous than non-religious persons. For
example, it could be (as other studies suggest) that religious
people are more generous as a whole, but have their generosity
as a lifestyle choice rather than in immediate situations. The
studies only appear to support the claim that, in these sorts of
immediate situations, compassion appears to play a larger role
for non-religious persons. The value of this sort of study is in
recognizing that generosity and compassion are not exclusive
to religious people (Saslow et al., 2013).
It is interesting how often the “gods” in these stories act like
spoiled children. For example, George refers to a passage
wherein the goddess Ishtar is scorned “like an angry child . . .”
(George, 2003, p. 474). With so few limits on their power and
pleasure, they need never grow up. Boundaries may in fact be
a gift.
By “balance,” I do not mean to infer a symmetry between need
and desire, as Levinas would emphasize the asymmetry of the
relationship between the self and other. (That gets into important, but very technical distinctions.) In this case, the term is
merely intended to emphasize that each is of value and has a
place in our lives.
Foster, for example, refers to the sun god’s “hollow promise
. . . of a fine funeral,” apparently recognizing the incongruity of the passage without seeing a way to make sense of it
(Foster, 2001, p. xxii). George offers a couple of possibilities
for Enkidu’s reversal, such as mirroring society’s ambivalence
about prostitution or as a commentary on the arbitrariness of
the destiny of every mortal (George, 2003). None of these
seem satisfactory.
Or stone crew, depending upon which translation. Either way,
the intent of the passage appears to remain the same.
This argument would be lacking if it did not include mention of the loss of the plant of rejuvenation. In a sense, this
was Gilgamesh’s consolation prize. If he found and ate this
plant, he would not live forever, but he would at least regain
the youth and vigor lost in this long journey—another indication of how an obsessive search for immortality achieves its
opposite (George, 2003). Oddly, upon obtaining the plant, he
does not eat it right away, allowing time for it to be stolen
away by a snake. Perhaps he wanted to save it for the old men?
Perhaps he wanted to test and see if it was poison? We cannot
really be sure. But, recalling that there are many themes woven

throughout the Epic, my best guess is that it serves another
purpose. For example, see George (2003).
10. Again, I’m not making any claims about the existence or nonexistence of an afterlife.
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